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Self-attribution is a public declaration of responsibility for the conduct of an operation. It 
is distinguished from covert operations, where perpetrators provide no such 
acknowledgement and attempt to conceal their identities. Although self-attribution is 
always an option, this thesis examines legal and strategic reasons for a nation state to 
publically acknowledge its role in the conduct of a cyber-operation. The central result is 
that whereas neither international law nor national policy requires self-attribution, under 
certain strategic conditions it may be preferred. 
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I. SELF-ATTRIBUTION, A UNITED STATES POLICY OPTION 
In the conduct of cyberspace operations, self-attribution is a declaration of 
responsibility for the use of a cyber-tool by the actor or agent who used it.  This work 
examines the strategic and legal conditions under which a cyberspace operation should be 
made public (self-attribution) or kept covert (clandestine operations) and provides the 
decision maker a tool box from which to draw upon.   
Through a review of relevant literature, it appears that this question is neither 
defined nor addressed in current research, popular culture or government discourse.  
Various United States policy issues are not addressed, national security issues are 
overlooked and geopolitical strategy opportunities are missed by not considering self-
attribution as a tool in our national strategies.  
The primary research question raised in this thesis concerns the attribution posture 
the United States should adopt in acknowledging responsibility for cyberspace 
operations.  From this question, the thesis examines how the decision making process that 
leads to the attribution posture of a cyber-action should be constructed.  The scope of this 
examination includes both cyber-exploitation and cyber-attack not only to explore the 
distinction between the two, but because that distinction is problematic legally and 
strategically.  Two criteria for the decision are proposed, strategic interest and legal 
ramification.  To support the thesis question, the two subsidiary questions are broken out: 
Under what conditions does it make strategic sense to self-attribute responsibility for a 
specific action in cyberspace?  When does law dictate that an attribution posture of 
acknowledgement be made? 
In the field of cyberspace many areas of study are emerging.  The problem of 
governments’ struggling with attribution to fight crime and prosecute enemies in 
cyberspace is well documented.  There are dozens of books and discussions on ways of 
achieving stealth across the networks of the world.1  Much of the literature focuses on 
two main ideas: first, the problem of attributing a cyber-action to an adversary to 
1 Clarke, Landau, Libicki and many others discuss the attribution challenges facing the nation.  
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demonstrate guilt or justify retribution and, second, attribution of individuals in the 
interest of public security concerning cyber-crime or threatening acts against states.  
Though these ideas are relevant in understanding the problems faced by national security 
policy makers, this thesis addresses a different topic: the subject of self-attribution.   
Self-attribution seems to have been overlooked and needs attention.  If the United 
States releases a cyber-weapon that can have significant and widespread effects across a 
nation or a region, then decision makers should consider the strategic and legal 
ramifications of self-attributing the operation.  By not pursuing self-attribution and 
operating in secrecy, the United States might miss opportunities in deterrence, diplomacy 
and foreign policy.  One could consider the severity of today’s internal cyber-threats to 
the United States as evidenced by the 2013 Mandiant report2 concerning Chinese state 
sponsored cyber-infiltration and repeated compromise of the United States’ government 
networks or the recent attacks on our economic sector and conclude that current policies 
(both deterrent and diplomatic) need adjustment.  These types of threats are a serious 
problem faced by governments in the larger context of attribution.  This work attempts to 
fill some of these gaps and to provide ways in which to answer these questions.  
Cyberspace operations and cyber-warfare have long been held to be clandestine or 
espionage-type operations using tools and methods that, if exposed, would compromise 
those very tools and methods.  This thesis builds on these ideas and proposes a different 
strategy that has not been pursued.  Jus ad bellum, embodied in the U.N. Charter, 
includes the justifications that are to be consulted before engaging in warfare and jus in 
bello limits the conduct of warfare; these criteria however do not extend to espionage-
type activities.  What these terms describe are subjects ranging from justifications and 
limitations for conducting conventional or nuclear warfare to definitions of the use of 
force and armed attacks.  When engaging in cyberspace operations the criteria and 
justification for a specific United States engagement is fluid and evolving due to the 
infancy of the question of whether we should use a cyber-weapon.  The criteria for self- 
 
2 See www.mandiant.com for the report exposing one of China’s government hacking teams. 
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 attribution of a cyber-attack however are essentially unwritten.  This question is new, 
existing only in the realm of cyber-space and is relevant to U.S. policy and decision 
makers.  
Harold Koh, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State recently said, “States 
are legally responsible for cyber acts [undertaken through proxies]” (Koh 4).3  This 
statement succinctly describes the attribution problem and deserves examination.  If 
cyber-attack is an action that uses a proxy to achieve stealth and can avoid attribution, 
what responsibility needs to be taken?  In 2010, the Secretary of Defense formally 
recognized cyberspace as a warfare domain; the fact that the United States government 
operates in cyberspace is public knowledge.  That we operate there is a known fact, it is 
admitted and confirmed by our government.  The legal issues surrounding cyberspace 
extend to both national and international law, which are still being formulated and 
written.  Where national law is binding to government agencies, the application of 
international law may not be in all contexts.  When that international law is unclear, 
nations may choose to ignore it should that choice serve national interest.  Furthermore, 
national law is malleable, able to be changed to meet the needs of the government.  
Though there appears to be controversy over conducting cyber operations 
anonymously, the United States (as many other nations do) continues to carry out such 
acts.4  Cyber-attack per se is even more elusive, as the instances of attributed state-on-
state cyber-attack are nearly non-existent.  The question of timing is also important.  If 
self-attribution is not decided upon, then the cyber-operation remains clandestine.  
However, if it is decided to acknowledge use of the weapon, will acknowledgement be 
preemptive, immediate or delayed?  These questions will be examined by this work and a 
policy will be proposed to provide decision makers with the tools needed to tackle this 
challenge.  
3 See Harold Koh’s remarks at the 2012 USCYBERCOM Conference, titled “International Law in 
Cyberspace.” 
4 Eric Sterner and Erick Schmitt both discuss the United States’ cyber-operations abroad; the Mandiant 
report exposes Chinas operations. Kaspersky Labs and Symantec have both found multiple instances of 
malware suspected to be created by state sponsored cyber institutions. 
 3 
                                                 
Cyber-attack between states and by non-state actors has changed significantly 
over the last decade.  Just a few short years ago the nebulous environment that was 
cyberspace was just that, loose formations of disparate and unrelated material, ideas and 
information.  Then within the last ten years, it began to coalesce into a highly connected 
and complex formation creating actors able to influence sovereign states.  The idea of a 
virus or worm once eluded most users of the internet.  Now these small annoyances have 
taken on names such as cyber-crime, cyber-attack and cyber-warfare and are coupled 
with nations’ strategic and tactical plans in both foreign policy and war.  Cyber issues 
have grown up though perhaps not fully matured; in fact, the threat of cyber-attack is 
considered to be the number one threat to the national security of the United States, 
surpassing nuclear attack, conventional warfare and terrorism.5  These issues are real; just 
as herculean efforts and resources have been poured into every aspect of nuclear warfare, 
defense and deterrence in the past, the same kind of effort must now be given to this new 
domain of warfare.  
United States self-attribution policy can be developed as a tool for foreign policy, 
warfare and strategic cyber deterrence.  It has importance to national security and could 
prove useful to the nation’s cyber warriors.  However, because of the infancy of the 
United States Cyber Command and national cyber policy, it has yet to be systematically 
addressed.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELATED WORK 
Dozens of recent articles, journals, policy reviews and books were examined.  The 
focus of the review was to find out if the central thesis question was answered either 
directly or peripherally and who in the cyber sphere was addressing the problem of cyber 
warfare strategy and legality.  The objective was to narrow the scope of this work by 
gathering current information and defining the unanswered space which will fulfill this 
research.  
5 See www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/threat.pdf: As of Sept, 2013.  Cyber threats have been 
increasing in importance over the last decade, but in March, 2013 at the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence: Current and projected national security threats to the United States hearing by James Clapper 
(Director of National Intelligence) it became the number one threat to U.S. security at home and abroad. 
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When mapping the current state of knowledge relevant to the question of self-
attribution and the strategic and legal criteria for self-attribution, there is very little 
literature available.  Deterrence is a common theme throughout much of the current 
literature and is an important topic in the attribution discussion. Many of the elements of 
good cyber deterrence policy will support this thesis, but it is not the main topic of this 
work.  Martin Libicki, in his article “Brandishing Cyber Attack Capabilities,” addresses 
the topic of exposing cyber capabilities as he examines the value of deterrence in cyber 
operations.  He builds a case for how power through the exhibition of cyber capabilities 
could affect the actions of other nations.6  Libicki opens by alluding to nuclear deterrence 
policies, conventional might and the need for demonstration to indicate to others the 
United States’ possession of such capabilities.  His article centers on the idea that cyber-
attack capabilities can be demonstrated in order to look powerful or make others look 
powerless to respond.   
Libicki examines the idea of hacking into a system and leaving a “calling card” as 
a means of demonstrating capability.  He then examines the ways and means of doing so 
and the probability of successfully relaying this communication to the appropriate 
leadership of the adversary.  His idea of brandishing capability is related to self-
attribution in practice and demonstrates why it would be a viable option.  Furthermore, 
his focus is primarily on creating deterrence, yet it does address this thesis’ question 
peripherally.7  His article touches on U.S. policy, relating it to nuclear or chemical 
weapons posture, stating that U.S. policy is still undefined.  His article primarily 
discusses ways in which to communicate to the adversary one’s capabilities in order to 
dissuade military operations (both conventional and nuclear), which is one type of self-
attribution.  Where this article puts forward ideas and assumptions from which to draw, 
its departure from this thesis stems from its reliance on the plausibility of success of 
demonstrating cyber capabilities and less on the reasons to do so.   
6 See Libicki in his article, “Brandishing Cyber-attack Capabilities,” concerning his methods of 
creating cyber deterrence. 
7 See the body of Libicki’s work: “Brandishing Cyber Attack Capabilities,” in which he demonstrates 
how to brandish a cyber-weapon and what the possible outcomes might be.  
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Where Libicki’s article examines how brandishing cyber-weapons could build 
deterrence by “declare[ing] a capability, suggest[ing] the possibility of its use in a 
particular circumstance, and indicate[ing] that such use would really hurt,” (Libicki, 29) 
it does not examine self-attribution criteria.  This thesis examines issues such as 
deterrence value, but also looks at the criteria that should be addressed when deciding on 
a self-attribution posture (overt or covert) such as foreign policy, diplomacy (negotiation 
from a position of strength), preemption, exhaustion of the adversary’s resource and 
economic and social impacts.  Furthermore, it examines and recommends the timing of a 
self-attribution announcement: preemptive, immediate, delayed, or never.  
Libicki’s work on brandishing cyber-weapons provides interesting insight into the 
implementation of public demonstration of a nation’s cyber capabilities.  Being published 
recently, there have been no published works that directly cite the article, but it is worth 
examining some of his sources.  Immediately, and of particular interest, are the 
statements titled, “Advanced Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander,” in 
which General Alexander very specifically addresses important policy issues pertaining 
to the legal responsibilities of the U.S. government when pursuing cyber capabilities and 
engaging in cyber warfare.8  These remarks provide excellent support in understanding 
the United States’ responsibilities when conducting cyber-attack and give valuable 
insight into when the United States may consider self-attribution of its actions.  Other 
components of this thesis that Libicki’s references address are preemption strategy of 
cyber-attack,9 active defense as a response policy10 and an interesting counter thesis to 
cyber deterrence policy.11  After thorough review, however, none of Libicki’s references 
address the question of self-attribution strategy directly or peripherally.  
In contrast, this thesis seeks to develop policy and strategy.  It attempts to flesh 
out the specific legal criteria that the United States could consult to decide on a posture of 
8 See the remarks of Keith Alexander in his speech, “Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith 
Alexander, USA, Nominee for Commander, United States Cyber Command.”  
9 For a discussion on cyber preemption strategy see “Cyber Strikes a “Civilized” Option: Britain.”  
10 Sterner discussed active defense in “Stuxnet and the Pentagon’s Cyber Strategy.” 
11 See Harknett, “Leaving Deterrence Behind: War-Fighting and National Cybersecurity.” 
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self-attribution.  To do this, this work will examine international law to provide 
interpretation and basis for claims.  It will draw from current discussion among U.S. 
policy makers.  The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare by Michael Schmitt and team, and his later article, “International Law in 
Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed” do not address self-
attribution but can support the legal aspect of this thesis. 
The Tallinn Manual is an invaluable work that addresses the complex legal issues 
surrounding cyber warfare and will greatly assist in justifying cyber-attack and cyber 
retaliation.12  It is derived from international law, rooted in the United Nation’s Charter 
and the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.  The 
manual provides a set of rules for applying the law of armed conflict to cyber-operations 
and is based heavily on the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Though the Tallinn Manual is 
a non-binding document, it is rooted in international law that is binding to states, making 
it a powerful document for the international community and a supportive document for 
this work.  
Schmitt’s article on international law strives to officially tie the United States 
position (and therefore policy) on law in cyber space directly to the doctrine the Tallinn 
Manual puts forward.  Schmitt refers to Harold Kohs speech titled, “International Law in 
Cyberspace,” in which Koh, Legal Advisor to the United States Department of State, 
officially recognizes the importance of the Tallinn Manual vis-à-vis U.S. cyber policy.  
Schmitt supports his argument, by showing how key members of USCYBERCOM were 
direct participants in the documents creation.  Finally, he uses this evidence to legitimize 
the Tallinn Manual, stressing that because of these events, the work is translated into de 
facto United States policy, a strongly supported argument.13, Schmitt and Koh both seem  
 
 
12 See Schmitt and the work he led Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare, which is the core of the legal claims of this thesis.  
13 Schmitt expertly ties the Tallinn Manual to U.S. policy in his article “International Law in 
Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed.” Harold Koh’s speech, “International Law in 
Cyberspace” contains his remarks at USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference in 2012. 
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to agree on the importance of adopting an adherence policy to international law 
concerning cyber warfare and their claims will be used in order to support a framework 
for self-attribution decision making.   
David Clark and Susan Landau provide excellent examples of the covert nature of 
actors conducting cyber-attack.  In their articles, “The Problem Isn’t Attribution: It’s 
Multi-Stage Attacks” and “Untangling Attribution,” they provide succinct understanding 
of the definition of attribution in cyberspace and how it is achieved.14 Similarly, Martin 
Libicki’s article, “When Should Attribution Be Announced,” examines attribution among 
state actors, and though the title appears to obviate the need for this thesis, it actually 
examines the question from the point of view of the victim, not the attacker.15  Richard 
Clarke and Robert Knake examine a myriad of aspects of cyber-attack and the attribution 
problem in Cyber War, providing the reader with a concise look at war in cyberspace.16  
Stephen Lukasik, in his article, “A Framework for Thinking about Cyber Conflict and 
Cyber Deterrence with Possible Declaratory Policies for These Domains,” briefly 
discusses the public demonstration of nuclear weapons to prove existence and capability 
and relates this to cyber weapons.  He puts forth these ideas as ways of building 
deterrence, which this thesis will address, but does not address self-attribution.17  All of 
these current works on the subject provide clues into pieces of the problem, but none 
squarely address the question of self-attribution.   
In his work, “Cyber-Threat, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure 
Protection: Defending the U.S. Homeland,” Anthony Cordesman makes several 
conclusions that are tangentially important to this thesis, but he also does not address the 
14 See Clark and Landau, “The Problem Isn’t Attribution: It’s Multi-Stage Attacks,” for a discussion 
on how attribution is achieved. See Clark and Susan in their work “Untangling Attribution.” for a definition 
of cyber attribution. 
15 See Libicki’s chapter: “When Should Attribution be Announced” in his greater work: Libicki, 
Martin C., “Cyber Deterrence and Cyber War.”  
16 See Clark and Knake Cyber War for a detailed look at cyber war among nations. 
17 See Lukasik’s work “A Framework for Thinking about Cyber Conflict and Cyber Deterrence with 
Possible Declaratory Policies for these Domains.” 
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question of self-attribution.18  Written in 2002, the work discusses policies that he United 
States should adopt for cyber policy and deterrence, and is still very relevant today.  It is 
necessary, however, to recognize his work as important to this thesis because he 
identifies several policies that are supportive to the strategic criteria for self-attribution.  
Cordesman concludes that a strong public statement about the United States’ cyber-
policy should include several points.  First, a fully developed and clear response doctrine 
should be expressed.  Second, such a doctrine should include the right to unilateral 
retaliation which must be strictly adhered to.  Third, such retaliation must be relayed to 
other actors as massive in scope and able to both cripple an economy and damage a 
society to a degree much higher than that actor is able to return.  Lastly, he infers that the 
adoption of international law and norms to support this capability must be accomplished.  
These points that Cordesman brings up will weigh into the strategic decision matrix that 
this thesis will put forward.  
Strategic cyber issues and policy are key factors in determining a United States 
self-attribution stance when employing cyber-attack capabilities.  Though there is no 
current literature that directly addresses the problem, there are several good sources that 
will contribute to this thesis.  Gregory Rattray and Jason Healey, in their article 
“Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber Capabilities and Their Use,” examine 
what types of cyber conflicts could arise between states and non-state actors and different 
strategies for employing cyber-attack.  They examine why states would decide to conduct 
cyber warfare in both covert and overt scenarios, both of which directly support portions 
of this thesis.19   William Lynn discusses the United States Cyber Strategy in his article 
titled “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy.”  Interestingly, Lynn 
neatly identifies the Pentagon’s strategy of a strong defense as a good offense.  He points 
out that government and commercial sectors must come together to develop cyber 
security solutions that nullify external threats.  However, the article does not identify 
18 Cordesman in his work “Cyber-Threats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Defending the U.S. Homeland,” discusses deterrence models including retaliatory doctrine, which is built 
upon later.  
19 Rattray and Healey examine the different types of cyber-attacks that may be employed among states 
in “Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber Capabilities and their use.” 
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offensive strategy that might include self-attribution, perhaps highlighting the need for 
research and clarification in this area.20  The last article in this review is John Sheldon’s 
article “Deciphering Cyberpower: Strategic Purpose in Peace and War.”  Sheldon 
examines the strategic uses of cyber power to achieve national policy objectives.  Though 
Sheldon does not address self-attribution policy in his work, he does focus much of his 
attention on shaping perception in the strategic environment, a theme of this thesis.21    
B. THESIS COMPONENTS 
To answer the question: Under what strategic and legal conditions should the 
United States publicly acknowledge responsibility for cyber operations? the remaining 
chapters of the thesis are organized as follows.  Chapter II, “The Nature of Cyber 
Attack,” focuses on secondary questions surrounding the thesis.  It first distinguishes 
between a cyber-attack and espionage, an important distinction that weighs legally into 
what is considered an act of war and what is not.  Chapter II then discusses the 
unintended release of advanced malicious code, perhaps one of the most important 
problems facing the designers and executers of cyber-attack today.  Finally, attribution is 
defined to demonstrate the difficulty of the problem this thesis seeks to answer. This 
chapter will provide the critical strategic information needed for decision makers when 
deciding whether self-attribution is a viable option.   
Chapters III and IV examine the current legal and strategic structures, 
respectively, that the United States relies on when engaging in cyber-attacks.  The legal 
review includes national policy, international law and traditional ethics that weigh on the 
decision to conduct cyber-attack and their bearing on covert or self-attribution stances.  
The United States strategy review section examines current policy considerations.  It then 
considers strategies the United States might pursue which involve self-attribution.  
Finally, each chapter will provide a matrix for decision makers to refer to.  This strategic 
and legal framework is a tool that will provide a means with which to decide whether 
20 Then Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn outlines U.S. cyber strategies in “Defending a New 
Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy.” 
21 Sheldon discussed leveraging cyber-capabilities for influence in “Deciphering Cyberpower: 
Strategic Purpose in Peace and War.” 
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self-attribution makes sense with respect to United States strategic policy and national 
security and whether national and international law require the acknowledgement.  
Chapter V addresses possible situations where United States strategy and policy 
point one way and law the other.  It examines why covert action may be preferred as a 
decision regardless of the strategic and legal consequences.  This is followed with a look 
at the real benefits to acknowledging responsibility for cyber-attacks conducted by the 
United States.   
C. BENEFIT TO GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY 
United States Cyber Command is responsible for conducting “full-spectrum 
military cyberspace operations” in the interests of the United States and “in accordance 
with all applicable laws and regulations.”  This thesis provides key advisors and decision 
makers in the Navy, U.S. Cyber Command and Department of Defense with a strategic 
and legal framework. This framework provides a matrix and a guide for determining self-
attribution under law.  This will support informed decisions based on national interest 
concerning acknowledgement of offensive cyber operations. 
It is clear that the topic of self-attribution is relevant and can provide meaningful 
contribution to the development of United States policy and USCYBERCOM stance 
when conducting cyber-attack.  There is considerable literature, discussion and national 
discourse surrounding the topic of cyber-attack, but self-attribution has been left 
relatively untouched.  Though many authors come close to the subject of self-attribution 
policy, none have discussed it directly, nor have they answered the question: Under what 
strategic and legal conditions should the United States publicly acknowledge 
responsibility for cyber operations?   
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II. THE NATURE OF CYBER-ATTACK 
August 2008: the nation of Georgia invaded its region, the Republic of South 
Ossetia (a partially recognized state in the international arena).  Provocation by South 
Ossetian Separatists groups finally pushed the Georgian government to action.  Only 18 
years prior, Georgia had been a Soviet state.  Two decades of separation was not enough 
to break old ties with Russia.  Russian agents had been at work for years subverting 
South Ossetia and used the conflict as reason to invade Georgia directly.  As a result of 
the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia, Russia came to the Ossetian’s aid, conducting a 
large scale invasion of the small nation.  Simultaneously, under a banner of patriotism 
and nationalism, Russian hackers shut large pieces of Georgian networks down.  
Georgia’s cyber borders were seized; government, news and commercial domains were 
paralyzed.  Russian governmental involvement was never ascertained.  The movement 
was declared populist in nature and of such magnitude and speed that Georgian 
communications were severely impaired; the Kremlin was unwilling to respond.22  
June 2010: Iranian government and commercial industries are inundated with a 
one-two punch cyber-attack, first with an espionage campaign followed by attack.  The 
Flame worm propagated itself across Iranian networks.  Flame, considered by anti-virus 
company, Kaspersky Labs as the “most sophisticated malware ever encountered,” is a 
cyber-espionage tool.23  Incredibly complex, this cyber espionage tool targets the 
Windows Operating System, Portable Document Format (.pdf) files, computer aided 
design (.cad) files and many other file formats.  Flame copies files, takes screen shots, or 
passively collects information sending it to a remote location via a web of tunneling and 
proxies across the internet.  The methods that it employs are virtually undetectable; the 
virus remained operational and undiscovered for more than four years.  In this instance, 
22 Smith, David. “How Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare,” American Foreign Policy Council, Issue 4, 
August 2012. 
23 See the following articles for examples of the Flame virus/worm: “Flame Cyber Weapon Fact, by 
Kaspersky, “Flame” by Symantec and “Flamer Virus—What Is Flamer Threat” by Norton.  
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Flame was probably a precursor for Stuxnet, the weapon.24  Stuxnet was a worm 
propagated by USB sticks or across networks to find and target Iran’s nuclear program, 
specifically the Siemens-manufactured industrial controllers used in their centrifuges.25  
For several years, this carefully orchestrated operation was built until, in 2010, the 
weapon was activated setting Iranian uranium enrichment operations back for months or 
years. Flame and Stuxnet are incredibly similar in construction.  Suspicions abound; the 
United States and Israel have been blamed (in part through insider leaks), however, to 
date, there has been no official acknowledgement of responsibility for either Flame or 
Stuxnet by any state actor.  
What do these two examples have in common with each other?  The perpetrators 
of the operations were nameless, faceless and most importantly nationless (meaning they 
acted at the behest of no state authority).  Attribution to a specific nation for either the 
Georgian or the Iranian espionage and attacks is difficult because of the nature of cyber-
attack.  Put differently, cyber-attack and cyber-espionage, especially by state actors who 
have considerable resources at their disposal, in the context of today’s attribution 
capabilities is often attributable only if the attacker wants it to be.  To answer the 
questions posed by this thesis it is important to note why cyber operations are 
overwhelmingly clandestine in nature and why the originators of the operations are so 
difficult to identify.   
A. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ESPIONAGE AND CYBER-ATTACK 
What constitutes a cyber-attack?  When is it considered a “use of force” or an 
“armed attack”?  These questions are not clear under international law.  The United 
States also has a weak definition, the decision residing at the executive branch.  Largely, 
if the United States’ interests or sovereignty are threatened or damaged by the release of a 
weapon, this may be considered an attack.  Consider the statement from The International 
Strategy for Cyberspace released by the White House in May 2011: 
24 Kushner demonstrates the link between Stuxnet and Flame in his article: “The Real Story of 
Stuxnet.” 
25 See Kushner’s article in the following for how Stuxnet worked against Iranian targets: “The Real 
Story of Stuxnet.” 
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All states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that 
certain hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions 
under the commitments we have with our military treaty partners we 
reserve the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, 
military, and economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable 
international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, 
and our interests. (“International Strategy for Cyberspace” 14) 
The release of a cyber-weapon such as the one used in the attacks on Georgia or 
Iran was damaging to both countries national interests and sovereignty, clearly 
constituting a cyber-attack.  In these cases, a response may have been warranted.  Of 
course, attribution issues played significant roles in both attacks; the attacker(s) could not 
be positively identified.  
Cyber-attack could be considered an act of war in many cases, especially when a 
state actor is involved in the release of the cyber weapon.  However, it contrasts starkly 
with conventional war.  In the conventional sense, war is an overt action.  When 
adversaries engage in warfare, they can identify each other, and though stealth may be 
used, the war is always an overt occurrence.  Cyber-attack between state adversaries does 
not yet follow the tenants of a conventional conflict; this is evidenced by the creation of 
the Tallinn Manual, which strives to bring cyber-conflict in line with the tenants of 
conventional warfare.26  
Cyber-attacks are deliberate actions aimed to deceive, deny, disrupt, degrade, or 
destroy an adversary’s networks or associated assets.  Cyber-attack, or computer network 
attack, is conducted by nations in order to cause damaging effects.  The methods and 
means used by state actors for delivering a cyber-effect have traditionally been secretive. 
Efforts are made to conceal these methods and means including the interior construction 
of the weapon, the way it is delivered, the way it is detonated and the methods used to 
avoid attribution.  First, the software used in the attacks is extremely sensitive in nature.  
As evidenced by Stuxnet, the software was designed to attack its target and when finished 
delete itself and all remnants of its presence.  Code used in a cyber-weapon may be 
tailored to deliver specific effects to specific processes of the target computer as in the 
26 See the Tallinn Manual for a comprehensive study and the creation of a Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) that pertains to cyber-warfare between nations.  
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Stuxnet code which targeted very particular industrial centrifuge controllers.  In other 
cases, the cyber weapon may be designed to have widespread effects.  In the Stuxnet 
case, the cyber-weapon was written carefully and executed stealthily to avoid leaving 
traces that could be used to identify the author or originator.  This type of cover is called 
concealment of “ways and means.”  Second, delivery methods must ensure that the 
identity of the attacker remains hidden.  Therefore, delivery of the cyber-weapon’s 
payload is completed in multiple stages further enhancing covertness.  The payload 
travels in a series of packets across the Internet.  The packet(s) contains all the 
information needed to deliver and activate the weapon.  In some cases, as in the DDoS 
attacks against Georgia, the packets themselves were the ammunition used to cause such 
significant network congestion as to cripple networks not designed to handle the traffic 
volume.  In a case such as this a botnet or high orbit ion cannon27 is the weapon itself.    
Other cyber-weapons are broader in nature and capable of affecting a wide variety 
of assets like the general distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against Georgia by 
unnamed hackers.  In this case, the weapons were made publically available, many able 
to hide the identity of the user.  The nature of networks enables the tracking of packets 
from one point to another.  Multi-stage delivery of the cyber weapon however, entails 
passing the packet(s) containing the weapon through many points and across many 
networks.  A proxy service, like the Onion Router or network of bots (remotely 
controlled computers) may achieve this delivery.  If done properly, this multi-stage 
filtering can allow anonymity of the packets, their original insertion points erased from 
record.28  These means create significant difficulty in attribution and maintain the 
covertness of the operation as evidenced in both the Georgian and Iranian cases.  Guesses 
may be made as to the origin of the weapon, but hard evidence linking the weapon to its 
author or its originator is difficult (though not impossible) to come by.  Without clear and 
concise attribution, nations may be unwilling to publicly risk denigrating a possibly  
 
27 A HOIC or high orbit ion cannon is a tool for conducting DDoS attack described by Breeden in 
“Hackers’ New Super Weapon Adds Firepower to DDOS.”  
28 For a detailed look at the difficulties associated with attribution see Clark and Landau in “The 
Problem Isn’t Attribution: It’s Multi-Stage Attacks.” 
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innocent nation.  In these cases, positive attribution could possibly be disruptive to the 
geopolitical situation or in extreme cases where critical infrastructure was attacked, 
considered an act of war.   
Conversely, cyber exploitation deals with the collection of information or 
mapping of adversarial networks or assets for intelligence purposes.  Cyber-espionage, 
often referred to as computer network exploitation in the DoD’s cyber-realm, is not 
generally held as an act of war.  For centuries, nations have engaged in espionage.  
Countries conduct espionage across multiple fields and disciplines, from exploiting 
humans to exploiting signals, to derive intelligence.  Network exploitation is a category 
of espionage which seeks to gather information about networks, infrastructure and assets 
(often completely unrelated to cyberspace, but supporting of general intelligence 
collection) without affecting targeted systems or leaving footprints.  Espionage tools and 
tactics (ways and means) are delivered in a similar multi-stage manner as cyber-weapons.  
Often ingenious methods are derived to avoid attribution.  In some cases, innocent 
civilian assets are subverted to become unwitting collection assets or “bots” and are used 
to hide the actual culprit.  In others, signals are bounced through nations that have laws 
protecting electronic traffic from being collected or released.  Like current computer 
network attack, this field is covert in nature and attribution of espionage activities could 
damage the United States and disrupt the geopolitical situation as evidenced by the 
current Snowden leaks.  Unlike cyber-attack, cyber espionage like traditional espionage 
does not violate the law of armed conflict and is not addressed by international law.  
Cyber-espionage cannot be considered a hostile act and therefore is not subject to 
forceful retaliation or other uses of force.29 
B. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF RELEASING ADVANCED 
MALICIOUS CODE 
Advanced malicious code has recently had an explosion of occurrence throughout 
the world.  Advanced malicious code is code that has been specifically crafted by state 
29 Schmitt’s team defines cyber espionage in The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Warfare.  
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actors for very specialized purposes ranging from cyber-espionage to cyber-attack.30  
This type of code typically has a narrow target set and is designed to do very specific 
things.  Today’s advanced malicious codes are built on uniquely crafted software and 
zero-day exploits.  A zero-day exploit is a piece of malware that exploits a previously 
unknown flaw in the functionality of some commercial software.  Zero-day exploits are 
extremely valuable and rare in the computer community.  Both Flame and Stuxnet are 
excellent examples of this type of malware.  Stuxnet used an unprecedented four zero-day 
exploits that all focused on Microsoft Windows systems.  Recently, Kaspersky Labs 
identified a piece of malware called Red October as a probable state-sponsored advanced 
threat.  Red October, it was reported, targeted nations on the periphery of Russia, 
especially the diplomatic wings of these nations, but instances have been found 
worldwide.31  The virus had been operating undetected since 2007, successfully 
collecting and exfiltrating data back to its originator completely undetected until late 
2012.  Designed to specifically target diplomatic intelligence on classified, unclassified 
and mobile devices, the code was so advanced it could resurrect itself even after removal 
and remediation efforts were conducted on the affected system.  It was so stealthy it 
remained undetected for more than six years.  
All of these pieces of malware, designed for specific purposes, do their jobs with 
incredible efficiency and stealth.  However, once discovered and remediated across 
hundreds or even millions of machines the viruses don’t simply go away.  Hidden victims 
will likely remain as will copies that other adversaries (often less capable) harbor for 
reuse or reengineering.32   
A sophisticated piece of advanced malicious code may contain many different 
parts or modules.  Red October, for example, was multi-faceted code, allowing for covert 
30 State sponsored cyber-weapons are malicious code, or malware that has been packages and 
weaponized for espionage or cyber-attack purposes.  Examples include Stuxnet, Flame, Red October, 
Mahdi, Shamoon and others.  Some are speculated to have been created under state sponsorship, others 
have leaked associations.  
31 See the Kaspersky article on the threats from the cyber weapon “Red October.” 
32 Stuxnet is a shining example of reengineering.  Since its release, dozens of “Sons of Stuxnet” have 
appeared in the wild; see Flame, miniFlame, WiPer and others. 
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insertion and attachment to a device.  Once active, the malware would look for ways to 
replicate and propagate itself.  Then it would begin data collection and exfiltration back 
to a common and inconspicuous location where state actors could download the data 
without attribution.  Each of the weapon’s complex modules served a different purpose.  
One looked for a thumb drive insertion and would surreptitiously attach itself to the drive 
in attempts to jump “air-gaps” to classified systems.  An air-gap is the physical space 
separating two logical spaces that are not connected.  Another module created a backdoor 
for command and control (C2) signals to be sent from the originator.33  Each of these 
modules was written into the original code, which was compiled into the final cyber-
weapon.  Once the weapon was released and identified the public could obtain copies of 
it.  Dissection of the virus quickly took place and the differing modules that exploited 
many aspects of computer systems and mobile devices were repackaged, rebranded and 
rereleased by criminals or other state actors for a variety of new purposes.  This type of 
activity has been evidenced clearly with the release of “miniFlame.”  A series of 
repurposed modules of the original Flame, the developers of miniFlame took all of 
Flame’s best parts and modified them slightly, making the malware covert and relevant 
again.  It took nearly two years for the new advanced malicious code to be remediated by 
anti-virus companies.  
The last and perhaps most dangerous threat from releasing advanced malicious 
code is the potential for fallout, blowback or infection of the perpetrator’s own assets.  
Stuxnet is an excellent example of a still lethal virus that has migrated into “the wild.”  
What this means is that the malware propagated itself too well and moved out of its 
intended target set, namely Iranian centrifuges with Siemens built industrial controllers.  
The worm has moved into dozens of countries infecting industrial sectors with impunity 
and indiscriminately.  The latest inadvertent infection is the United States company 
Chevron whose industrial sector uses Siemens Industrial Controllers.  It is likely that the 
worm affected many nations through cyber-fallout.  Though Stuxnet was highly 
discriminate in its desired effects, its propagation was not effectively controlled. 
33 Kaspersky Laboratories deconstructs Red October in “Kaspersky Lab Identifies Operation “Red 
October,” an Advanced Cyber-Espionage Campaign Targeting Diplomatic and Government Institutions 
Worldwide.”  
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Consequently, some might label it as indiscriminate weaponry, which is considered 
illegal under international law and will be discussed at length in later chapters. 
C. WHAT IS ATTRIBUTION AND WHY IS IT SO DIFFICULT TO 
ASCERTAIN? 
Attribution, simply stated, is determining the source responsible for an attack.  
Among state actors and adversaries, it is assigning identity to the cyber-attacker.  
Achieving attribution, could justify a state looking for evidence to conduct a retaliatory 
strike, enable the prosecution of a non-state actor, or provide a state with the ability to 
name and shame the perpetrator.   
 
Figure 1.  A Typical Botnet 
It is also very difficult.  Avoiding attribution is one of the most important goals in 
current models of cyber exploitation and cyber-attack among state actors.  One of the 
most common ways attribution can be avoided through multi-step or multi-stage 
approaches, such as the methods described by Clark and Landau.  In this manner, the 






defeating attempts at attribution.34  In Figure 1, computer “A” is the Bot Master 
conducting cyber-operations through a Bot Army, “B” (Clark, Landau 1–2).  The 
individual “bots” are innocent computer assets positioned around the world that have 
been infected (by a bot herder) for use by the Bot Master.35  A bot may be an infected 
server or an individual personal computer.  In either case, the owners of the infected host 
do not know that their computer’s services are also being used on behalf of the bot 
master.  Command and control signals are sent out to a bot or an army of bots and the 
individual bots conduct the attack on the target computer “C.”  If and when attribution 
efforts are conducted by the target’s security services, the packet trail, domain name 
information and IP addresses will lead back to the bot, which will likely reside in a 
different country.  The attacker can use a layer of command and control, sending signals 
through many bots exponentially increasing the amount of work required to attribute 
responsibility. 
Proxy services are another way to keep an attacker’s identity and IP address 
secure.36  Unique media access control (MAC) numbers, which identify individual 
devices, are stripped off of frames as information traverses the internet, but the Internet 
Protocol (IP) address remains constant for the proper routing of packets.  A proxy server 
is one of the basic ways to keep an adversary’s IP address hidden, as the proxy server’s 
IP address provides the cover.  On a network, you might use a proxy server to act as the 
intermediary for your communications from point A to B.  Individuals may route their 
request or packet to the proxy and the proxy will forward the data to the destination.  
When the proxy receives the answer, it will collect the answer and reroute it back to the 
requestor.   
The proxy server model is used as the basis for several powerful technologies that 
come close to preventing attribution.  The onion router (ToR), for example, enables 
34 Clark and Landau provide a detailed look at one of the main reasons that attribution is difficult 
through the employment of botnets in their work “The Problem Isn't Attribution: It's Multi-Stage Attacks.” 
35 For an in depth look at Botnets see: “Bots and Botnets—A Growing Threat.” Symantec. (2013). 
http://us.norton.com/botnet/. 
36 To understand how proxies aid in hiding identity see: Lambert’s work, “The Basics of Using a 
Proxy Server for Privacy and Security.”  
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anonymity online through a network of volunteers that allow traffic to randomly pass 
back and forth through their networks.37  An entity’s IP address is masked and the 
information sent is encrypted.  The packets sent enter the ToR network and are bounced 
randomly across the volunteer network until they reach the destination.  The return traffic 
is routed similarly and the sender receives the answer.  Traffic is fairly secure and 
anonymity is achieved to a high level.  Another example, from a business stand point, is 
Carrier-Grade Network Address Translation (CG-NAT).38  This system provides non-
attribution at the ISP level as a byproduct of IP address aggregation.  The IPv4 address 
space is exhausted and as a solution to IP scarcity, CG-NAT extends the useful life of the 
model by providing multiple users in a single network with one IP address to share.  This 
model makes tying packet traffic to an individual very difficult and creates a system of 
non-attribution for a pool of customers.39  These models create even greater problems 
when botnets are overlaid on top of them.  State and non-state actors can use this 
technology to their constant advantage, hiding from adversaries behind a wall of 
anonymity.  
D. SUMMARY 
Clark and Landau claim that cyber espionage, in the manner that states like the 
U.S. and Russia execute it, is virtually undetectable.  Furthermore, if detection were 
possible, attribution at the individual level is even more difficult.  Fingering the actual 
person at the keyboard is nearly impossible, and if possible, proving who this person was 
working for is another very tough challenge.40  States having immense resources can 
leverage malware tools and software flaws to operate anonymously on the internet and  
 
inside each other’s countries.  Covert operation will likely be the norm even if open 
37 See a full explanation of ToR at: “The Onion Router” at Wikipedia.   
38 For an explanation of Dual-Stack see Doyle’s article, “Understanding Dual-Stack Lite.”  
39 CGN is a common mask for IP addresses; see Perreault’s “Common Requirements for Carrier 
Grade NATs (CGNs).” 
40 Clark and Landau, “Untangling Attribution.” 30–31. 
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cyber-warfare is conducted openly between state actors.  As long as these actions remain 
unattributable, nations will be reluctant to retaliate.  
The usefulness of considering public acknowledgement of cyber operations is to 
turn the current ideas of approaching attribution described in this chapter upside down.  
Conventionally, warfare is simply a different form of communication between states.  
Typically espionage and attack are used when other methods of communication have 
been exhausted or ignored.  Instead of using stealth in cyber-espionage and cyber-attack 
as the modus operandi, consider the possibility of using self-attribution as a means of 
relaying the communication.  Telling the enemy that “we own your network” through 
demonstration and then acknowledgement, yet not allowing them the privilege of 
independent attribution is a powerful tool.  To both exhibit dominance and reveal 
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III. A LEGAL REVIEW 
Cyber warfare is a new and emerging subject, and its rules are evolving.  
Likewise, the laws and policies governing its conduct are also evolving.  One of the main 
reasons for this is that there have been no large-scale state-on-state cyber wars from 
which to examine.  A second reason is that the discipline of war in cyberspace is so 
unorthodox and so fluid in scope and definition, that capturing its potential and applying 
rules to it is extremely difficult.  After an exhaustive examination of international law, 
traditional ethics and U.S. national policy, it seems that there is no concrete language 
dictating that the United States must self-attribute any actions in cyberspace.  This is not 
to say that cyber warfare should not have boundaries or rules.  In a discipline where the 
civilian population is potentially as capable as the state of creating devastating weapons, 
the formulation and adoption of national or international policy and law takes time and 
consideration.  This chapter provides a legal review of international law and ethics 
pertaining to cyber warfare and particularly self-attribution, and it strives to provide 
decision makers with a framework from which to make legal decisions about self-
attribution.  
The United States recognizes a series of international laws and conventions that 
relate to cyberspace and cyber warfare.  First and foremost, the U.N. Charter, which 
specifies the basic rights of states and provides the criteria needed to engage in warfare, 
including cyber warfare.41  Second, the Tallinn Manual outlines international law with 
respect to cyber warfare.  These two documents and those documents and laws from 
which they are derived are acknowledged by the United States as a basis from which the 
country may wage war and respond to actions from others in the international  
 
 
41 See U.N. Charter, Article 2 concerning sovereignty, dispute, and the use of force. See U.N. 
Charter, Article 51 concerning the right to self-defense. 
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community.42  Therefore, these documents will make up the basis of this discussion.43 
Other documents included in this discussion are the Law of War, or Law of Armed 
Conflict,44 the War Powers Resolution,45 and The Articles on State’s Responsibility.46  
The United States also recognizes just war theory in its conduct of warfare.  Just war 
theory provides the criteria of jus in bello and jus ad bellum that need to be satisfied in 
order to engage in warfare.47  In order to provide decision makers with better criteria for 
a self-attribution stance, the notion of just war theory needs to be included in the 
discussion.  The following sections are the result of this research.  
A. LAW AND ETHICS  
During the last several years, the United States has struggled with the issue of 
cyberspace and how to deal with it as a nation.  In March of 2013, James Clapper, the 
Director of National Intelligence, in his report to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, declared that the cyber threat had become the number one security concern 
to the American people at home and abroad.48  This growing threat has prompted 
awareness and action at nearly every level of our government and across the international 
community.  Detailed reports, mandates and laws have been developed and promulgated 
from the United Nations, the White House, the U.S. Department of Defense and nearly 
42 The United States acknowledges international law as evidenced in multiple U.S. policies, most 
notably the Law of Armed Conflict and Law of War as prescribed by the Department of Defense. 
43 See the Koh Speech made at the NSA in 2012, linking U.S. Cyber Law and The Tallinn Manual. 
See Schmitt’s article on how the U.S. follows international cyber law in “International Law in Cyberspace: 
The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed.”  
44 NWP 1-14M; The Law of War is a naval publication that outlines the laws associated with armed 
conflict.  
45 See The War Powers Resolution for the requirements of reporting between the executive and 
legislative branches of the U.S. Government.   
46 See the Articles on State’s Responsibilities for what is required of the state concerning its actions at 
home and abroad. 
47 See Orend’s War for discussions on Just War Theory, jus in bello and jus ad bellum; Farrell, 
Michael. Modern Just War Theory: A Guide to Research; Cook, Martin L. The Moral Warrior. 
48 Cyber threats have been increasing in importance over the last decade, but in March, 2013 at the 
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Current and projected national security threats to the United 
States hearing by James Clapper (Director of National Intelligence) it became the number one threat to U.S. 
security at home and abroad. 
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every other major U.S. department.  The release of Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-7 (HSPD-7) delineates government agencies’ responsibility to safeguard key 
resources from cyber-attack.49  It is possible that these critical infrastructures could be 
used to establish what a “use of force” cyber-attack would be defined as (tripwires that 
might illicit a response), and policy and law could be written on how to respond to an 
attack on these resources.  
The creation of United States Cyber Command came about to protect against and 
deter those growing threats to U.S. security.  With the creation of USCYBERCOM came 
the need for rules to guide the discipline of projecting power in cyberspace.  In 2011, the 
Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report, to Congress, reads:  
As with all of the activities that DoD pursues in the physical world, 
cyberspace operations are executed with a clear mission and under clear 
authorities, and they are governed by all applicable domestic and 
international legal frameworks, including the protection of civil liberties 
and the law of armed conflict. (DoD Cyberspace Policy Report 1) 
Many important documents link United States policy to both international law and 
the Law of War as pertains to cyberspace; two, in particular, are examined here.  Harold 
Koh, State Department Legal Advisor, in his speech given at Fort Meade, Maryland to 
USCYBERCOM made several claims important to this thesis.  Koh linked national cyber 
warfare policy to international law in his discussion, titled: “How do we apply old laws of 
war to new cyber-circumstances, staying faithful to enduring principles, while accounting 
for changing times and technologies?”50 
The answer is that our national policy with respect to the United States’ conduct 
in cyberspace is directly connected with and adheres to international law.  This speech 
interestingly coincided with the release of the Tallinn Manual, which seeks to provide 
governance or rule sets over the actions of states in the conduct of cyber warfare.51  Prior 
49 HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection identify critical 
infrastructure and key resources in the United States for the purpose of securing them in cyberspace. This 
document was expanded in the Feb. 2013 PPD, “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience.”  
50 Koh, in his speech made at the NSA in 2012. 
51 Michael Schmitt makes an excellent argument linking U.S. policy to the Tallinn Manual in: 
“International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed.”  
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to these comments, yet equally important, was the hearing of Lieutenant General Keith 
Alexander for his confirmation as Commander USCYBERCOM, where he stated that 
USCYBERCOM will be governed by the U.N. Charter and other international law 
principles as reflected in U.S. rules of engagement.  He goes on to state that any use of 
force by USCYBERCOM will be congruent with international law, which helps link U.S. 
national policy to international law.52  These documents and comments therefore provide 
an adequate linkage between international law and national policy.  
International law may be considered to be the requirements and responsibilities 
that are levied upon the nation in its international conduct against and among other 
nations.  This chapter focuses on the legal responsibility of the state and does not take 
into account the strategy a state is employing.  If a state commits an illegal act under 
international law, it is responsible for its action under international law.  If that state 
commits an illegal act and is caught, it has a responsibility under international law to 
address and if necessary redress the act.  This is supported by the U.N. Security Council’s 
right to enforce law through sanction or the conduct of warfare and by the numerous 
international tribunals that have been conducted to right international wrongs.  However, 
does the state have a legal responsibility to disclose its operations in conjunction with its 
actions?  The distinction and large problem is that the action must be attributable to the 
state in order for this onus of responsibility to stick.  The articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts specifically includes attribution (the perpetrator 
must be exposed) as an element required for an act to be “wrongful.”53  This research 
finds that international law delineates no hard requirement to publicly acknowledge an 
action or require “self-attribution.” 
Just war theory may provide some traction for the theory of self-attribution, but 
not obligation.  Just war theory provides the closest guidance available to point to a 
stance of self-attribution.  The theory can be considered an international norm and is 
52 See the remarks of Keith Alexander in his remarks, “Advance Questions for Lieutenant General 
Keith Alexander, USA, Nominee for Commander, United States Cyber Command.” 
53  The responsibility of states is derived from Articles on State Responsibility: International Law 
Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.  
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incorporated into United States’ national policy; consider Congress’s role in declaring 
war, and the military’s guidance through the law of armed conflict, both derivatives of 
the theory.54  It serves to provide several beneficial indicators to leaders that the actions 
that they have taken or are about to take are morally and ethically justified.  It does more 
than that as well.  Just war theory can provide justification to the people of the nation and 
deliver an ultimatum to the adversary before the initiation of hostilities providing for a 
final moment to resolve an issue that is causing imminent threat of attack.55  All of these 
ideas are found in preemption, and are addressed in just war theory.    
Just war theory provides seven criteria that are required to be met before initiating 
a conflict.  Jus ad bellum stems from these; they are not standardized and are subject to 
interpretation, but they are basically the same throughout most current writing.  The 
theory is broken down:56 
• Just cause: A conflict must be just, such as in self-defense, to protect 
innocents, or as a punishment for wrong doing.  
• Legitimate or right authority.  That the international political process was 
followed first.  In this case, international law was consulted.  In the United 
States, also that Congress must be consulted by the President (an 
unresolved conflict). 
• Public declaration: That a state may conduct warfare only when made 
public to both its citizens and to the enemy state(s) resulting clearly in the 
reasons for going to war or conducting warfare.  This provides a final 
moment for resolution between parties and makes it clear to the state being 
attacked, why the attacking state is fighting.  This acknowledgement 
provides the authority for waging war.  
• Just or right intention: Such as to limit war and restore a balanced state of 
affairs. 
• Proportionality: Such as considering the casualties of war with respect to 
the expected results of the war.  Are the benefits worth the costs, or is 
what it takes to win worth the cost of the outcome? 
54 A look at the Law of Armed Conflict, the Army JAG’s Deskbook includes an examination of how 
Just War Theory principles are applied to U.S. policy and decision making: Law of Armed Conflict 
Deskbook. 
55 Martin Cook makes these points as part of his discussion in The Moral Warrior.  
56 Farrell, Orend and Cook each provide similar explanations of just war theory in their works; these 
are presented as: just cause, public declaration, just intention, proportionality, last resort and probability of 
success.  
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• Last resort: Such that all other alternatives have been exhausted. 
• Reasonable hope or probability of success: That mass violence without 
measurable impact or resolution to the conflict is futile. 
National policy and law for going to war is codified in the War Powers Act.  
Accordingly, if the United States goes to war, the president has a responsibility to present 
his plan to Congress and announce to both the adversary and the American people as to 
the intentions of the president and the use of military forces.  The act serves to limit the 
scope and duration of the introduction of military forces into hostilities.57  Cyber-attack 
seems to fall under this policy but context is also important and therefore ethical 
considerations should also be taken into account.  Law and ethics therefore should go 
hand in hand in order to better examine this problem.  The next section will therefore 
examine principles and factors that decision makers should look at when deciding 
whether or not to self-attribute.  
B. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Several scenarios described in Figure 2 were identified in which cyber-attack 
between states might take place.  The criteria used to advise on a stance of self-attribution 
are based on applicable national and international laws and just war theory, placing 
emphasis on the universal obligation of states to assume responsibility for their conduct 
and that of their organs in cyberspace.  Organs of the state are defined as any parts of the 






57 See the War Powers Act which seeks to limit the use of U.S. forces unless permitted by Congress. 
58 The responsibility of states is derived from Articles on State Responsibility: International Law 
Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
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Decision Matrix for Recommending a Self-Attribution Stance         
Type of Cyber Operation Legal Justification  Stance 
requirements/recommendations 
 
Cyber Espionage (all instances)  Not addressed in international  Self-attribution is never required by law or  
    law    Just War Theory (JWT) 
 
 
Preemptive cyber-attack, prior  War powers resolution  Self-Attribution by international 
to conventional attack   Just War Theory   law, national law and JWT.  Attribution 
        falls on the affected state.  
 
Offensive cyber-attack sanctioned  U.N. Charter Art 39   Self-attribution is not required by law or  
under U.N. Security Council resolution Tallinn Manual Rule 18  JWT, declaration is made through the U.N.  
        as a proxy. 
 
 
Offensive cyber-attack,   U.N. Charter Art 2(4)   A declaration of war should be considered  
valid military target, dual use  U.N. Charter Art 52   and in some cases in effect is self-.  
object, civilian object.   Tallinn Manual Rule 10   attribution. However, self-attribution is  
        not required for opening salvos or  
        subsequent operations. 
     
 
 
Self-defense cyber-attack  U.N. Charter Art 51   Self-attribution is not required, but should  
against another state   Tallinn Manual Rule 13  be considered as a valid policy option.  
  
 
Reprisal measure due to  Law of War Ch 6.2.3.1  Self-attribution is not required, but should  
unlawful act by the enemy      be considered as a valid policy option. 
 
 
Use of indiscriminate    Conventional Weapons Convention Consider self-attribution as a gesture to  
cyber-weapon in attack  Law of Armed Conflict Ch 9  restore regional stability or through non-  
(all instances)   Tallinn Manual, Rule 43  conventional channels to avoid regional  




Response cyber-attack   U.N. Charter Art. 51   Never required, but may be considered to  
due to intrusion, proportional,  Tallinn Manual Rule 9  justify the U.S. cyber-attack or to highlight  
valid military target, civilian,  Articles on State Responsibility  the country being attacked as the original  
dual use object   (22,49-53)    perpetrator. 
   
  
 
Conduct of cyber-attack by state  Tallinn Manual Rule 6(9)  Self-attribution is not required or  
citizen acting at behest of state  Articles on State Responsibility   recommended.  
    (22,49-53)  
 
 
Failure to act to prevent a  Tallinn Manual Rule 6(4)  Self-attribution is not required, but may be  
cyber-attack by citizens       considered to improve geo-political  
situation.  
 
Figure 2.  Decision Matrix for Self-Attribution 
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Interestingly, public declaration (as set forth in just war theory) may provide the 
closest guidance to point to a stance of self-attribution.  If the United States goes to war, 
the President has a responsibility to present his plan to Congress and either a declaration 
of war by Congress is made to both the adversary and the American people or Congress 
may choose to limit the scope and length of the action.  In certain situations where cyber-
attack is the means of warfare, or cyber-attack is the opening salvo of a war, the attack 
could in effect be attributed to the United States at the point of declaration of war.  In 
other words, declaring war and firing the first volleys through cyber-attack would, in 
effect, be attributing these attacks.  These might be more overt cyber-attacks that would 
cause widespread outages or damages at wars onset, as covert cyber activities could go 
on prior to the declaration of war as well as after it without self-attribution.  It must be 
clearly noted that this would be a policy decision and there is no requirement in 
international law, just war theory or national law that require it.  
Of the many scenarios examined, none arise in which self-attribution is required 
in the sense that it is spelled out in law or obligated in theory.  The research for this 
conclusion has explored many legal scenarios seeking to find ones in which self-
attribution was a requirement.  Finding none, it remains important to discuss why the 
requirement is absent.  The lack of an obligation to self-attribute will impact strategy as 
equally as a hard requirement.  The following scenarios demonstrate that law and ethics 
pose no obligations, but also examine why policy makers may consider different 
approaches.  
1. Cyber Espionage 
The conduct of cyber espionage between states is far more prevalent than open 
cyber-attack and warrants discussion here due to the highly covert nature of the 
operation.  Espionage and cyber espionage are not addressed in international law vis-a-
vis public declaration.  Neither the U.N. Charter, just war theory, nor the Tallinn Manual 
provide details on the conduct of espionage and what is or is not legal.  Cyber espionage 
by the United States for the purpose of intelligence gathering in all instances does not 
require self-attribution and there are no reasons why these actions should ever be 
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attributed.  However, cyber espionage is becoming more and more intrusive, with many 
types of tools that can be left behind in the target system.  It is questionable as to whether 
all of these tools fall under the espionage banner.  Certainly, if any of them fall into the 
following section (those which may be considered acts violating international law) then 
self-attribution may be considered. 
2. Preemptive Cyber-Attack Prior to Conventional Attack 
In the case of United States conducting cyber-attack where the attack occurs 
without the presence of troops but in an area designated to become a combat zone, a 
conservative view of the War Powers Resolution could be taken.59  In this case, reporting 
(that action will occur pre or post execution) to Congress by the executive (a matter of 
public record), and reporting to the public should occur.  This does not mean that a 
specific operation is ever required to be publically acknowledged (just the war), but the 
following example provides an interesting twist on self-attribution.  
Prior to conventional attacks into Libya in 2011, a cyber-offensive was planned 
against the Qaddifi regime in order to strike at his regime’s military networks.  This 
action was to be a series of cyber-attacks aimed at enabling allied forces to proceed into 
the nation unhindered by radar and air defense networks.  One of the reasons it is 
believed that the cyber-attack was canceled was due to the War Powers Act requiring the 
president to notify Congress of the action.  “Ordering a cyber-attack on Libya might 
create domestic legal restrictions on war-making by the executive branch without 
Congressional permission…require[ing] the executive to formally report to lawmakers 
when it has introduced forces into hostilities.”60  Though public acknowledgement may 
not have been the reason the attacks were called off, it nevertheless was a factor.  This 
means that the cyber-attacks would be exposed and that self-attribution would occur.  
Overt cyber warfare was not conducted perhaps because this U.S. national policy would 
force self-attribution.  It should be noted that the actual conventional attacks were very 
59 See “The War Powers Resolution,” U.S. Document (50 U.S.C 1541-1548), 1973.  
60 See the article on the plan to cyber-attack Libya by Schmitt and Shanker: “U.S. Debated 
Cyberwarfare in Attack Plan over Libya.”  
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public and fully acknowledged both prior to and during the action under the War Powers 
Resolution.61  The President himself announced the action before and during the conflict.  
In this case, cyber-attack was affected by the War Powers Resolution, noting that self-
attribution was not required to proceed with preemptive cyber-attacks resulting in war, 
but self-attribution would have in effect been achieved.  
3. Offensive Cyber-Attack Sanctioned Under U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 
An offensive cyber-attack is illegal under international law in most cases.  The 
first example of where it could be held as legal is under the U.N. Security Council’s 
purview.  If a Security Council Resolution is passed and authorizes or mandates military 
action against another state and the United States decides that cyber-attack will be the 
means of attack against that state then the sovereignty of the nation under attack is not 
considered to be violated.  The Tallinn Manual supports this claim.  In this case, The 
United States, attacking via cyber operations may be conducting what would be 
considered an “armed attack” or “use of force” cyber-attack but not violating 
international law.62  Under the umbrella of the Security Council’s resolution, so long as 
the cyber-attack did not violate jus in bello, the attack would be justified and protected 
and no requirement would exist to self-attribute.  Any offending state would have been 
authorized under the Security Council resolution to take the action and self-attribution of 
a specific nation would not occur.  
4. Offensive Cyber-Attack 
The U.N. Charter states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”63  
From this statement, the Tallinn Manual provides supportive wording saying, “A cyber 
operation that constitutes a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
61 See instances of use of the War Powers Resolution: Libyan Conflict for the report to Congress.  
62 The Tallinn Manual, Rule 18 and the U.N. Charter, Article 39. 
63 See the U.N. Charter, Article 2(4). 
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political independence of any State, or that is in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations, is unlawful.”64  If an offensive cyber-attack or threat of 
cyber-attack is conducted by the United States against another nation and the targets are 
purely military in nature, but the attack is not sanctioned by the Security Council or 
executed for the purposes of self-defense, then the offensive attack is considered an act of 
war and is illegal under international law.  This notion applies to dual-use objects (those 
used for both civilian and limitary purpose) and purely civilian objects (all objects that 
are not military objectives) as well.65  This act not only violates the use of force, but also 
violates jus ad bellum regardless of the type of target. 
These acts are all clear violations of international law.  Cyber-attack with the 
intention of war (use of force, armed attack, or threat of) against another nation 
(regardless of the reasons) requires the United States to declare war, which according to 
just war theory and The War Powers Act publically acknowledges the action of going to 
war (but not the specific operation within that action).  Strangely, in practice this may not 
be the case; this is an unclear contradiction, because the United States has not made a 
formal declaration of war in more than 40 years (the War Powers Act only being 
established in 1973).  Further, the threshold of tolerance by the international community 
for considering cyber operations a use of force or armed attack is a high bar to date.  It 
appears by all accounts that current cyber-operations continue to fall below the threshold 
of an armed attack, the level of activity which would trigger the right to self-defense.  
Nevertheless, the United States should consider, at least, self-attribution of a cyber-attack 
if the intention is to conduct war.  
5. Self-Defense Cyber-Attack against Another State 
Under international law and the law of armed conflict, the right to self-defense 
individually or collectively is an inherent right.  The U.N. Charter and the Tallinn 
64 See the Tallinn Manual, Rule 10. 
65 See the Tallinn Manual, Rule 38 and 39.  Also, see the U.N. report on the review of the NATO 
bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in which it further defines dual-use objects 
under the U.N. Charter: “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” 
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Manual provide legal support to this for all attacks including cyber-attack.66  The United 
States may respond in self-defense to any hostile act perpetrated against it through means 
of cyber-attack.  So long as that cyber-attack is proportional in damage and no violation 
of international law occurred, then self-attribution need not be considered.  Of course, 
national policy makers might consider the message that the nation wishes to convey, 
should we undertake cyber-attack as a matter of self-defense.  
Context also plays a significant part.  Consider if the United States responds in 
self-defense directly to a threat.  In this case, jus ad bellum, the reason to go to war, is 
satisfied so long as the attack is necessary and proportional in response.  However, if the 
attack causes significant collateral damage or non-military targets are targeted or 
destroyed, then the jus in bello principle of distinction between military and non-military 
objectives applies; proportionality might be violated.67  If this attack was a large scale 
cyber-attack in self-defense, United States decision makers should seriously consider 
their responsibility and possible need to redress.  In this case, the targeting and attack of 
civilian objects68 (an unprovoked use of force even if accidently in self-defense) is illegal 
under international law, and though collateral damage is allowable, the effects of our 
weapons should be considered.  In these cases self-attribution should be considered as a 
policy option.  
6. Reprisal Cyber-Attack Measures due to Unlawful Actions by the 
Enemy  
Similar to the above, under international law the right to self-defense is an 
inherent right.  If in war, an adversary conducts a cyber-attack against the United States 
and that cyber-attack is considered a use of force attack against targets not allowed by the 
law of armed conflict then United States policy and international law allow for a response 
in the form of reprisal.  Any immediate response is a reprisal against the adversary, even 
if it falls below the threshold of a use of force.  Accordingly, LOAC dictates that the 
66 See the U.N. Charter, Article 51 and the Tallinn Manual, rule 13. 
67 See the Tallinn Manual, Rule 14. 
68 Civilian Objects as described by the Tallinn Manual are all those objects that are not military in 
nature or used to support military operations.  These objects may not be targeted.   
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authorized and justified reprisal, in response to an illegal act of warfare, should be 
proportional and the acts taken in reprisal should be brought to the attention of the enemy 
in order to achieve maximum effectiveness.69  In this situation, in order to bring the 
action to the attention of the enemy, the reprisal cyber-attack should be self-attributed by 
the United States and conveyed to the adversarial leaders.  The reprisal should be 
publicized or announced at, a minimum, to the adversary.  In this case self-attribution is 
recommended but not required in order to communicate the action to the adversary.  
It should be noted that in the case of cyber operations, simply stopping an attack 
may not meet the threshold of reprisal.  Consider blocking IP ranges to stop an ongoing 
attack by an adversary.  This means may not be considered a reprisal, but actively 
pursuing the culprit(s) and conducting operations against them to prevent the attack from 
happening again should be considered.  In either case, communication to the adversary 
should take place especially if LOAC has been violated.  
C. LESS OBVIOUS LEGAL SCENARIOS 
1. Use of Indiscriminate Cyber-Weapons or Creation of Cyber-Fallout 
in Cyber-Attack 
An indiscriminate cyber-weapon is defined as “the release of a weapon that 
cannot be directed at specific military objectives or limited in its effects” (Tallinn Manual 
121).  If the United States conducts a cyber-attack and makes use of a cyber-weapon that 
could be considered indiscriminate then this act is illegal (that it should not be done is 
obvious; that it may occur in the future still remains plausible).  If a weapon used by the 
United States in a cyber-attack is incapable of being used in a way which enables a 
distinction to be drawn between military targets and civilian objects then it is inherently 
indiscriminate and therefore unlawful.  Though the use of the weapon is illegal, only 
attribution of the perpetrator by a third party can trigger international action.70  This 
problem is vexing in an environment where specially tailored and highly advanced 
malware can be released into the wild and attribution can be avoided.  The targets may be 
69 See Law of War, Chapter 6(3.2.1). 
70 Again, The Articles on State Responsibility, Article 2, grapples with this issue, that an unlawful act 
must be attributable to the perpetrator.  
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very specific, and the malware may target them surgically, but as discussed in Chapter 
Two, the cyber-weapon more likely than not creates fallout, leaves traces of the malware 
that can be repurposed for infection of additional unsuspecting victims.   
In this case the United States could consider a variety of options.  If large scale 
destruction or damage was caused (economic impacts, power grid failures, etc.) the U.S. 
could consider self-attribution as way to correct the situation.  Acknowledging the attack 
would have geo-political impacts, but if the fallout was regional and the attack was 
justified, then restoration of regional systems by the United States to restore stability 
could be a powerful and beneficial gesture.  In another case, providing discrete 
information about how to defeat the worm or virus in question might also provide the 
same effect without self-attribution.  Lastly, self-attribution could be done using private 
channels, between state actors as a way of not enflaming regional hostilities but restoring 
systems affected by cyber-fallout.  There are many ways to maintain confidentiality of 
the attack or the ways and means of its delivery and still protect the region from 
indiscriminate effects.  
2. Response Cyber-Attacks Due to Intrusions: Three Instances 
Differing from the situations above concerning self-defense, a response cyber-
attack is an attack in response to an intrusion into United States networks; the Tallinn 
Manual refers to this action as a countermeasure.  The offender may or may not be 
conducting qualified cyber-attack (which would be considered a use of force or armed 
attack) but is conducting operations that meet a level of intrusion warranting response 
actions.  The United States may take response actions in the form of cyber-attack against 
the target to stop the action (this could include the damage or destruction of the 
adversary’s networks).  In this first instance, the United States may conduct a cyber-
attack against a military target found to be the source of an intrusion into U.S. networks.  
These cyber countermeasures are considered by international law to be legal and justified 
and not an instance of armed attack, regardless of the result.71  Second, if the cyber-
attack is in response to an attacking dual-use object then the effect is the same.  Dual-use 
71 See the Tallinn Manual, Rule 9 and the U.N. Charter, Article 51. 
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objects are considered targetable by the military.72  Third, if the intruding object is 
civilian in nature and the United States attacks the object to stop the intrusion then the 
effect is different.  It is possible that a state sponsored attack could utilize civilian objects 
in order to carry out the attack.  In this case the rule concerning civilian objects does not 
apply.  Civilian objects that are used to military advantage are permissible targets.73  
However, if the cyber-attack is not from a military source and not working on behalf of 
the state (a civilian hacktivist for example) a response of cyber-attack, with the goal of 
destroying the attacker, cannot take place, though lesser operations appear to be 
acceptable to stop the intrusion.74  
In the situations above, the United States can order cyber-attack as a means to 
degrade, destroy or deter attacks only so long as they are proportional and the attacks fall 
under legal action within the scope of international law.  It is recommended that no self-
attribution stance be taken in these cases, as there is no requirement for it.  However, the 
United States could use the situation as a means to justify its cyber-attack (as a response) 
or to highlight the blatant wrong doing of the perpetrator.  
3. Conduct of Cyber-Attack by a State Citizen at the Behest of the State 
Under The Articles on States Responsibility, states are responsible for their covert 
and overt actions and they are responsible for the actions of their private citizens who act 
on the states instructions.  All actions of states that involve cyber-attack either by the 
state or by its citizens acting at the behest of the state are the responsibility of that state.  
These citizens are considered organs of the state if acting on its behalf and by virtue of 
72 This is due to the same rule as under self-defense where dual-use objects are seen as valid military 
objects. 
73 See the Tallinn Manual, Rule 38. Again, civilian objects can never be attacked legally under 
international law, even in cyberspace; Tallinn Manual, Rule 38.  The only exception is if those objects are 
acting on behalf of the military, making them valid military targets; Rule 37 prohibits attacks on civilians, 
but an operation not qualifying as an attack is permissible.  In this case, responses for defensive purposes 
may be legitimate.  
74 Again, Tallinn Manual Rule 37 and 38 provide distinction between civilians working on behalf of 
the state and those not working on behalf of the state.  This does not take into account terrorist actors that 
may be stateless.  
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the law of state responsibility.75  If citizens of the United States conduct cyber-attacks for 
their government, then the United States Government is responsible for their actions.  In 
this case, if Americans are conducting cyber-attack against other states at behest of their 
government, those actions of the United States citizen(s) may be considered unlawful 
under international law (depending on the effects of their attacks).  Self-attribution is not 
required, but U.S. decision makers may weigh the benefits of acknowledgement.  
4. Failure to Act to Prevent a Cyber-Attack by Citizens of the State 
(With Knowledge) 
The United States bears responsibility under international law for attributable 
cyber-attacks of its citizens should they break international law.  Therefore, should the 
state knowingly allow such an act (without efforts to stop it, or fail to prosecute post-act) 
it is illegal.  This is especially true of citizens not acting at behest of the state.76  
International law states that if the citizen is committing cyber-attack and the state knows 
that the attack is imminent, ongoing, failed or completed and fails to take action to stop or 
redress the action then this is tantamount to condoning the action.77  This is therefore 
illegal under international law.  In this instance, the United States should strongly 
consider self-attribution and then take action to police its citizens to avoid geo-political 
friction.   
D. SUMMARY 
There are no concrete statements in international law requiring states to self-
attribute their attacks on other states.  Just war theory, does provide us with jus ad 
bellum, the criteria for going to war, which can lead us to a conclusion resulting in a 
decision to self-attribute.  The Articles on State Responsibility demonstrate that a state is 
responsible for its actions whether it is caught or not. However, responsibility in 
cyberspace (as in physical space) for wrong is only challenged if the state is caught in the 
act or admits wrong doing.  Only in a case where a declaration of war is required, and 
75  See the Tallinn Manual, Rule 6 and The Articles on State Responsibility, Article 8. 
76  See the Tallinn Manual, Rule 6.  
77  See the Tallinn Manual, Rule 6. 
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thus attribution is assumed, does self-attribution come into play.  This does not mean that 
self-attribution is not a serious policy issue that merits attention given the legal scenario.   
The lack of requirements or obligations in law and ethics to self-attribute cyber-
operations and attacks creates opportunities for applying and leveraging strategy.  In the 
end, self-attribution will be more a choice dependent on geo-politics and national interest 
and less on international law or norms.  
The potential of cyber-attack to transcend national boundaries with speed and 
ease makes the issue an international one.  The potential of that cyber-attack to be 
launched from nearly anywhere by state or non-state actors mandates the need for 
international response and control, hence the Tallinn Manual and the power granted to 
the U.N. Security Council.   This idea of a system of international norms is incorporated 
in the United States’ policies concerning conventional, nuclear, biological, mine and 
cyber warfare and is supported by treaty ratification, the U.N. Charter, the Law of Armed 
Conflict, the Articles on the Responsibilities of States and most recently by the laws set 
forth in the Tallinn Manual.  Just as an unlawful conventional attack or nuclear attack 
may not be hidden or covert in the eyes of international law due to their overt natures, 
neither should cyber-attack regardless of it covert nature.  Until the emerging cyber 
battlefield is better agreed upon under international law and norms materialize 
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IV. STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR SELF-ATTRIBUTION 
When discussing the strategy of self-attribution, context is important.  This 
chapter will examine how strategy and timing may influence the decision to self-attribute 
a cyber-attack.  Perhaps the choice to conceal one’s action avoids certain war.  Perhaps 
taking responsibility for an action provides currency for diplomacy.  Perhaps the use of a 
cyber-weapon is for purposes of brandishing.  The launch of a cyber-weapon in an 
offensive attack as a means to communicate our possession of the weapon is an extreme 
notion.  The risks associated with developing and using weapons that have the potential 
for massive and widespread destruction are extensive, and thoughtful intelligent strategy 
must be employed to oversee their possession and use.  Cyber-weapons could be 
considered the next round of such weapons.   
The United States has formulated and promulgated many documents to outline its 
future strategic security posture; four stand out in terms of cyber-security.  United States 
National Security Strategy (NSS) lays out the broad strategy that the nation will pursue.  
The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) outlines goals designed to 
secure the United States in cyberspace.  The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD-7) identifies critical resources and key infrastructure (CRKI) that if attacked by 
cyber-means would constitute catastrophic risk to national security.  The United States 
International Strategy for Cyberspace (US-ISC) seeks to build international norms, forge 
partnerships and emphasize the nation’s right to unilateral and collective self-defense.  
These four documents highlight the seriousness of cyber threats to the nation and treat the 
nation’s public and private digital infrastructure as a strategic national asset and warfare 
domain.   
This chapter examines four strategic conditions under which the United States 
might consider a stance of self-attribution.  Each of these conditions supports the nation’s 
national security strategies of securing cyberspace and deterring foreign and criminal 
aggression in cyberspace.  They link to the NSS, CNIC, HSPD-7 and US-ISC in order to 
demonstrate how self-attribution might advance national security interests and objectives 
in cyberspace.  Figure 3 lists the four strategies and provides decision guidance for each.   
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The first reason for self-attribution is to communicate our capability to the 
adversary.  Demonstrating our cyber capability can provide several benefits such as 
exposure of the adversary’s weakness, exhibition of our strength, or perhaps simply 
demonstrate that our capability exists.  Second, self-attribution can be used strategically 
to communicate willingness or intent to use cyber-weapons both offensively and 
defensively.  This may entail the creation of a policy of guaranteed proportional response 
to an attack or intrusion that is public and offers the option of self-attribution as a means 
to communicate intent to the enemy.  Conversely, the U.S. may want to pursue policies to 
demoralize or intimidate; conducting a cyber-attack to attrite an adversary’s resources or 
morale could achieve these policy goals.  Self-attribution of an intrusion into adversary 
networks will force him to expend resources in attempts to counter.  A more invasive 
intrusion or attack could elicit significant countermeasures which could harm his national 
economy or damage morale.  Third, self-attribution can be used as a means of building 
deterrence by self-attributing a combination of capability and intent.  Finally, and 
conversely, a posture of self-attribution could be used to set things right, restore systems 
to operational status or redress grievance or damage.  The remainder of this chapter 
discusses each of these four strategic conditions. 
A. SELF-ATTRIBUTION TO COMMUNICATE CAPABILITY 
Capability can be communicated to an adversary by self-attributing a 
demonstration of that capability.  US-ISC explicitly expresses the U.S.’s right to self-
defense in cyberspace, either unilaterally or collectively.78  If a cyber-attack is considered 
as a means of self-defense, then international public disclosure of our capability can 
provide our adversary with the foreknowledge that we possess the means to defend 
ourselves.  Perhaps a strategy of forward presence in cyber space is sought.  In this case, 
self-attributed public demonstration of capability reminds our adversaries that we are out 
in the domain preparing and training to our capabilities.  If we choose a strategy of 
pursuing and isolating rogue nations, private self-attribution of a cyber-operation 
(between two parties or a small group) can tell the rogue nation that we are watching and 
78 The US-ISC discusses the basis for norms, citing the right of self-defense. 
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have capable means of defeating them.   If our strategy is collective security, among 
nations, then our capability in combined operations also merits disclosure, or self-
attribution.  One example may include exhibition of cyber-weapons publicly in a test 
environment. 
A National Cyber Range is currently being developed in order to test the 
effectiveness of cyber tools.79  This cyber-range could have a public aspect, one idea 
could be the creation of a Joint/Combined Cyber Exercise Area (CXA)80, just as the 
demonstration of new surface-to-air-missiles or radar systems serve to demonstrate 
conventional weapons’ and tools’ capabilities.  Such a program would officially tie the 
possession of cyber capabilities to USCYBERCOM and communicate their existence 
without necessarily disclosing their interior construction, command and control or 
deployment methods.  The program would, however, demonstrate the tools effectiveness 
through employment in an environment constructed to be sandboxed (an environment for 
testing software without allowing harm to networks) and publicly available for viewing.  
A CXA could be an environment where both offensive and defensive capabilities 
could be tested or displayed.  As with conventional and nuclear tests, these could be 
publicly witnessed.  Success and failure could be announced, avoiding the need to 
downplay leaks or revelations.  As the CXA was developed, joint (J-CXA) and combined 
(C-CXA) exercises could be conducted to demonstrate and hone maneuver and targeting.  
This type of activity would demonstrate not only the capability and existence of various 
cyber weapons, but also the relationship of nations participating in the exercises.  A 
demonstration of maneuver warfare among allies could help fulfill the US-ISC’s 
requirement to develop means and methods of collective self-defense and security to 
deter and defend against state and non-state actors.81 
79 See DARPA’s white paper “The National Cyber Range” on the development of the NCR for testing 
and collaboration. 
80 DARPA describes the current National Cyber Range as useful for advanced cyber research, 
development of new capabilities, analysis of malware, cyber training and exercises.  The range could be 
used to exercise military maneuver in joint and combined exercises.  see: 
<http://www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2012/11/13.aspx> for more information on DARPA’s plans.  
81 The USISC highlights the need to work with allies to promote collective self-defense. 
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In his work, “Brandishing Cyber-Attack Capabilities,” Libicki discuss the reasons 
to demonstrate one’s weapons.   He shows how brandishing cyber weapons can support 
threat making or counter the threat of the adversary (Libicki 1-4).  Public 
acknowledgement and demonstration in a test environment can support these strategies 
and others.  If cyberspace is to be considered a new domain (both public and private) and 
our goal is to secure it through dominance or primacy, then demonstrating our capability 
is a key to supporting this goal.  Just as demonstrations of nuclear weapons confirmed 
offensive capabilities and testing of anti-ballistic missiles confirmed defensive 
capabilities, demonstrating cyber-weapons can achieve the same ends.  However, the 
United States also strives to partner with its allies to achieve security and can use these 
exercise areas as means to demonstrate and achieve collective security between nations. 
Communicating capability through demonstration requires that certain criteria are 
met before engaging in the activity.  Policy and decision makers should consider the 
following: 
• When does self-attribution through public display of a weapons test make 
sense? 
• Is there reasonable expectation that the display will have the desired effect 
on the adversary?  
• Is there reasonable expectation that the demonstration will send a signal to 
the appropriate adversarial leadership? 
• Will demonstration have a negative effect, such as escalation or sparking 
of an arms race? 
• Is the cost of self-attribution through these means worth the expected 
benefit? 
Decision makers should also consider timing and legal questions.  Self-attribution 
of cyber capabilities in this case should occur prior to or concurrently with action against 
the adversary and perhaps used as geo-political capital to prevent conflict.  However, a 
demonstration of a capability might expose the United States to a situation where its use, 
if considered first-strike, preemptive, indiscriminate or accidental might draw attention 
internationally since attribution could be more easily established.  
This approach will likely be most effective against state actors and less effective 
against non-state or individual actors that are outside of the diplomatic arena.  Such an 
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approach can directly link efforts to national security needs and goals outlined in the 
United States International Strategy for Cyberspace.82  If there is reasonable belief that 
using the national CXA can support strategies such as collective security and 
communicate to potential adversaries that a cyber-attack could be met with a 
sophisticated and capable response then the demonstration should be considered.   
 
Decision Matrix for Recommending a Self-Attribution Stance 
Type of Cyber Operation Strategic Support  Stance 
requirements/recommendations 
 
Demonstration of capability to  Supports National Security  Utilize national Cyber Exercise Area (CXA)  
communicate ability to defend  objectives outlined in US-ISC   to demonstrate capability of cyber-weapon 
unilaterally or collectively      and capability of joint and combined  
force in cyber-maneuver warfare.  
    Timing will be in advance of conflict. 
 
 
Doctrine developed to create  Supports National Security    Use doctrine to demonstrate willingness to. 
redlines and guarantee response.  objectives outlined in US-ISC,   respond. Requires the creation of redlines.  
Self-attribution to demonstrate    CNIC, and creates redlines in  Use cyber-operations to attack/penetrate  
U.S. Strength or expose adversary support of HSPD-7   adversary infrastructure to elicit response. 
weakness to communicate willingness     Timing depends on strategy. 
or intent.   
 
 
Self-attribution as a means of  Supports National Security    Use a combination of demonstration and the  
forwarding deterrence policy  objectives outlined in CNIC and  communication of intent and willingness  
    US-ISC concerning building deterrence through self-attributed cyber-operations and  
    programs and deterring malicious doctrine to deter adversaries actions in  
activity.     cyberspace.  Timing will be variable. 
 
 
Self-attribution to set things right  US-ISC and Cyberspace Policy Review Use self-attribution as a means to set things  
    calls for strategy to build and establish  right in order to assist in establishing norms  
    norms in cyberspace.   of states’ conduct with respect to the use of  
        cyber-weapons. Timing depends on strategy 
Figure 3.  Decision Matrix for Self-Attribution 
B. SELF-ATTRIBUTION TO COMMUNICATE WILLINGNESS OR 
INTENT  
Self-attribution may be used to communicate willingness or intent to an 
adversary.  Defense of the homeland is a consistent theme in national discourse and an 
overarching tenant of National Security Strategy.83  If the United States is to pursue ways 
82 US-ISC discussed building and strengthening partnerships through the development of means and 
method of collective self-defense, a goal that the CXA could help achieve. 
83 National Security Strategy outlines several goals, the first of which is the security of the U.S. 
homeland and its citizens.  
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in order to secure cyberspace, we must be able to effectively communicate our intentions 
to perceived and real adversaries.  It terms of defense, the U.S. might communicate its 
intolerance for intrusion; that it will be met with resistance and if necessary, retaliation.  
In terms of offense, the U.S. may use direct or indirect aggression, perhaps to win hearts 
and minds or demoralize war fighters and maybe to merely show a level of invasive 
intrusion.  
Consider two scenarios, internal doctrine that outlines defensive intent (what we 
will definitely do) and external signals (what we are able to do) to demonstrate 
willingness to act.  First, self-attributed cyber-operations in response to cyber-attack or 
cyber-intrusion could be met with guaranteed response.   Doctrine could be developed 
that states a cyber-attack will be met with a counter cyber-operation in a proportional 
response aimed at stopping the attack, preventing additional attacks or even destroying 
the capability.  In this case, self-attribution of the response attack would relay to the 
adversary that the United States will respond and not tolerate such action. Second, self-
attribution to communicate willingness to use cyber-weapons could take on several 
forms.  In the case of warfare, exhausting an adversary’s resources or negatively affecting 
morale through attrition could be a powerful tool.  Cyber-attack or cyber-exploitation 
may be conducted against an enemy to make that enemy appear weak, or to make the 
United States appear strong.  This is likened to sending a message to the leaders of the 
adversary.   Self-attributing a cyber-operation to the enemy’s leadership, even subtlety, 
can prove an effective strategy to communicate the United States’ willingness to use 
cyber-weapons. 
1. Doctrinal Case 
United States International Strategy for Cyberspace affirms the right to self-
defense as: “Consistent with the United Nations Charter, states have an inherent right to 
self-defense that may be triggered by certain aggressive acts in cyberspace” ( US-ISC 
10).  The document further reserves the right to use all means necessary to defend the 
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nation.84  Yet, how do we officially tie a threat or aggressive act in cyberspace to national 
security; an armed attack or act of war?  The development of response doctrine could 
achieve the desired effect.   
Consider the critical infrastructure as defined in HSPD-7.  HSPD-7 defines what 
critical infrastructure in the United States is vulnerable to cyber-attack and designates 
agencies responsible for securing each.  Critical U.S. infrastructure is defined as: 
Agriculture, Public Healthcare, Water, Energy, Finance, Monuments, Industry and 
Defense.85  Redlines or tripwires could be established at the critical infrastructure laid out 
in this document.  A doctrine of immediate and guaranteed proportional response, which 
includes retaliatory cyber-attacks, could be adopted to specify how the United States will 
respond should any of the nation’s critical infrastructures be penetrated or attacked. 86  
This declaration of critical cyber-infrastructure would link thresholds to national security 
objectives (defense of the nation) in order to deter attacks and create trip-wires (redlines), 
producing a more accurate definition of what a use of force or armed attack would be.  In 
turn, this doctrine could officially tie a threat in cyberspace to national security and 
define a cyber “act of war” or “armed attack,” linking the strategy directly to national 
security objectives. 
Communicating intention through doctrine and the creation of redlines has both 
benefits and drawbacks.  Policy and decision makers should consider the following: 
• Drawing redlines can be a powerful deterrent, however, a redline implies 
that crossing the set line will incur response.  Failure to act could be 
construed as weakness and negatively impact foreign policy goals.  
• Intrusion falling below the threshold of armed attack or unwarranted 
aggression might warrant response crafted to be aggressive against 
attackers, yet also remain below the threshold of declared war; like 
surgical strikes of proportional response.  
84 Self-defense is reaffirmed as a right for the United States.  National Security Council (U.S.), and 
United States. Executive Office of the President. “International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, 
Security, and Openness in a Networked World.” p. 14. 
85 Derived from “HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection.” 
86 Cordseman discussed the need to develop clear response doctrine in the conclusion of his work, 
“Cyber-Threats, Information Warfare, & Critical Infrastructure Protection.”  He discussed the clear need to 
distinguish between what is a nuisance and what may need massive retaliation in general terms; this chapter 
builds on that idea and lays out the lines that might be developed to decide on response.  
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• There would be no need to delegate authority to release of cyber-weapons 
below the executive office, since response would be at the time and place 
of our choosing.  
• If the adversary’s intrusion or attack was of sufficient sophistication or 
severity it could warrant response or simple “denial.” 
• The doctrine must be public, (or delivered privately the adversary) in order 
to effectively communicate the message to potential adversaries.  
• Allies, such as those in NATO should be consulted when making 
declarations which might impact collective security agreements.  
• The action of creating redlines could be seen by some nations as an 
escalatory practice causing tension in foreign policy.  
The idea of self-attribution through doctrine implies public acknowledgement 
prior to engagement and therefore advanced timing.  What constitutes a cyber-attack 
against the United States becomes more stringently defined.  The adversary is notified of 
what will happen should the redline be crossed and, therefore, should the United States 
conduct a retaliatory response, attribution will be assumed.  International law states self-
defense is an inherent right and what triggers self-defense is defined, so United States 
actions triggered by this doctrine would be legal under international law.  This approach 
would likely be effective against state actors.  It could encourage those states lenient 
against malevolent non-state actors operating within their borders to act more 
aggressively to curb their illegal cyber-activities.  In this case defense and deterrence 
value could be achieved.  
2. External Signals Case 
In this case, a cyber-operation may be conducted against the adversary’s networks 
to disrupt or degrade those networks in order to demonstrate willingness.  Self-attribution 
could be used to tell the adversary that the United States has the ability and means to 
attack, but not disclose the ways or means that the exploitation was conducted.  In 
essence, “we have control of your networks; you are powerless to stop us.”   Libicki 
addresses nearly the identical issue: his “hack in and leaving a calling card” idea (Libicki 
viii).  He claims that we need to choose between making the adversary look weak and 
demonstrating our strength.  In order to do either he surmises that we must demonstrate 
the capability repeatedly in order to be effective and that an effective campaign may 
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affect the enemy’s choice to pursue war.87  In support of these theories, self-attribution to 
send signals can provide an enhancement of this idea, eliciting several benefits.  First, a 
feeling of being powerless can be detrimental to the morale of the adversary.  A strategy 
of demoralization only starts with the adversary’s military; it can have drastic effects on 
public opinion.  Uncertainty, through indirect aggression, such as documented cyber 
intrusions, could as a result eat at the strength or legitimacy of a government or régime.  
Second, the adversary will be required to expend considerable resources to defeat the 
capability.  This equates to an expenditure of in money, time and resources which the 
adversary may not have in abundance.  This then is an effective means of attrition, 
especially if the adversary has no guarantee of success against the intrusion. 
A brief examination of incidents reports to US-CERT shows that between 2006 
and 2012, reported incidents (Federally reported incidents of malicious code injection or 
unauthorized accesses to information) rose by 782 percent or nearly 10,000 incidents per 
year.88  Contrast that with spending patterns; on a nearly identical linear rise of more than 
a billion dollars a year; the U.S. has spent billions of dollars combating cyber-intrusion 
and attack, with 2014 spending predicted estimates topping 14 billion dollars.89  This 
shows how malicious cyber-activities inside a nations network can lead to changes in 
policy and attrition of resources; here dollars used to defend networks.  It is important to 
note that these are only reported Federal attacks and Federal dollars; the private sector is 
affected as well.  This pattern appears to demonstrate that forcing a nation to defend 
assets that it thought secure can lead to a tremendous expenditure of resources that may 
have been spent elsewhere.  Eliciting such a response in other nations through self-
attribution of a cyber-operation is possible.   
Communicating willingness through cyber-operations can be used to achieve 
strategic goals.  Policy and decision makers should consider the following: 
87 Libicki, Martin C. “Brandishing Cyber-attack Capabilities.” p. vii-ix. 
88 From: “Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined 
and More Effectively Implemented.”  
89 See VanRoekel’s article: “Federal Information Technology Budget Priorities 2014.”  
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• Does it make sense to tell the adversary that you are present on their 
networks?  Will the introduction of a threat be counterproductive to the 
strategic goal? 
• Burning a cyber-capability may occur (exposure of a capability may be 
enough to allow the adversary to counteract it).  Will there be sufficient 
residual access if the attributed capability is defeated? 
• If the goal is to achieve presence in a sensitive network, will the message 
be conveyed to the appropriate leadership? 
• Will the adversary “feel” the desired level of pain or anxiety that will elicit 
the desired reaction: defense, dispirit or weakness? 
• If the nation being attacked or threated has considerable resources, will 
their use of resources to defend be counterproductive?  Is the cost of 
maintaining presence significantly smaller than the cost to the adversary? 
Self-attributing a cyber-operation against an adversary to communicate 
willingness can take advantage of timing.  Exposing the operation to the adversary after 
the operation is complete will likely elicit the desired action.  The enemy will be forced 
to take measures to secure his networks.  Used as a precursor to war, this can be a 
powerful force multiplier and a blow to the adversary’s morale; if the enemy realizes that 
his air defense systems are compromised, then he is uncertain his weapons will work to 
defend his area of operations, perhaps leading to more decisive victory or faster 
termination of war.   In terms of legality, things are less clear.  Cyber-attack, as defined in 
the Tallinn Manual, causes death, damage or destruction to physical objects and is not 
permitted under international law, unless in self-defense or under U.N. Security Council 
authority.  Unintended collateral damages fall into the cyber-attack definition.90  Cyber-
operations conducted under the guise of espionage or not rising to the level of “attack” as 
defined in the Tallinn Manual are less likely to draw scrutiny.  However, launching a 
preemptive operation or attack for the purposes of showing willingness to attack could 
appear as an act of aggression and therefore decision makers must carefully weigh the 
expected outcomes and benefits against the possibility of causing a wider conflict.  
This strategy can forward U.S. strategic initiatives outlined in U.S. CNCI.  
Initiatives supporting the development of better counter-intelligence and deterrence 
90 See the Tallinn Manual, Rule 30. 
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strategies could include demonstrations of willingness against adversaries that are 
penetrating U.S. networks and conducting cyber-operations there.91  As discussed, the 
U.S. is already spending billions to secure government networks.  Actions in the form of 
cyber-operations to communicate willingness against the adversary could certainly be 
justified as proportional responses to invasive threats to our national security.   
C. SELF-ATTRIBUTION TO FORWARD CYBER DETERRENCE 
A combination of demonstrating capability with intent and willingness can create 
a powerful deterrence model. The nation’s National Security Strategy seeks to strengthen 
deterrence strategy in cyberspace primarily in support of defense of our economic and 
defense structures.92  Using self-attribution through strict doctrine, public demonstration 
or attributed operations could signal other nations that the United States will not tolerate 
acts of aggression or invasive intrusion against its networks.  One example to achieve 
these strategies could be cyber-attack in a proxy warzone.  The United States has fought 
several wars in which the adversary was supported militarily by a tertiary nation (with 
whom the U.S. was not at war).  Recent U.S. involvement in Libya and Afghanistan 
where Iranian influences are confirmed can demonstrate this point.  In these cases, 
demonstrating attack capabilities against the primary adversary in the war zone 
demonstrates capability and intent to non-participating adversaries, for example Iran, in a 
setting where attribution is implied.  A show of dominance in cyber-capabilities can be a 
powerful deterrent to those who may wish the United States harm. 
Similarly, where the United States is providing the military support, such as in 
Syria, which is being aided by Russia.  Self-attribution of a cyber-attack against Syria, in 
support of rebel allies, would be effective in sending the message to a third party without 
actually engaging them that the United States has the capability, intent or both to conduct 
cyber-attacks.  Martin Libicki, in his work “Brandishing Cyber Capabilities,” discusses 
the “teeth” a deterrence policy has and that it is based on the willingness a state has in 
91 Issues six and ten deal with counter-intelligence and deterrence of adversaries in cyberspace: “The 
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.”  
92 The White House recognizes the difficulty of deterring sophisticated adversaries and seeks a 
strategy to bolster and renew deterrence models, see: The White House, “National Security Strategy 2010.”  
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enforcing its established redlines and the greater its capacity and capability to strike 
(Libicki 3–4).  A strategy of indirect aggression could satisfy such a policy in a non-
escalatory environment.  Combining demonstration in willingness, intent and capability 
in careful and meaningful ways can achieve the teeth that Libicki speaks of and perhaps 
do so in a way that does not spark escalatory behavior.  
Working to achieve deterrence through self-attributed cyber operation has 
benefits and drawbacks that need to be considered: 
• Demonstrating capability and intent through a third party suggests 
avoiding direct confrontation with the intended recipient of the message.  
This may prove an effective way of deterring more powerful adversaries 
without having to engage them militarily.  
• Deterrence policy must be seen as serious, but redlines need to be 
carefully crafted, and demonstrations need to be carefully conceived so as 
not to spark undesired escalation or conflict.  
Forwarding cyber deterrence through self-attribution strategies is a long-term 
strategy that requires considerable planning and careful timing.  As discussed in the 
above sections, demonstration of capabilities can occur in a CXA or a current war zone, 
communication of intent should be attributed early to establish tripwires, and 
communication of willingness can occur at the time and place of the decision makers 
choosing.  Together, these techniques can be combined to create a firm deterrence stance 
and support national security objectives of building enduring deterrence strategies and 
programs that will deter hostile and malicious activity as outlined in both the CNIC and 
US-ISC.  These methods combined might be effective against both state and non-state 
actors, perhaps encouraging offending states to better police their intelligence agencies 
and populations.  
D. SELF-ATTRIBUTION TO SET THINGS RIGHT 
Last, self-attribution may be used in order to right a wrong done by the United 
States.  This thesis has taken into account the need for policy makers to carefully weigh 
their options when engaging in cyber warfare for both legal and strategic reasons.  It has 
also stressed how important it is for a state to take responsibility for the actions it takes in 
cyber warfare.  Furthermore, this thesis has shown how just war theory and the 
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Responsibilities of States have become ingrained in both national policy and international 
law.  It therefore makes sense to consider public acknowledgement of cyber operations 
taken by the United States that cause inadvertent or deliberate damage, collateral or 
otherwise.  Responsible behavior in cyberspace is outlined in U.S. International Strategy 
for Cyberspace as the central goal of our strategy and a primary national interest.  
Therefore, this strategy can directly support this notion.  
Many scenarios could prompt self-attribution to set things right.  The United 
States could conduct a cyber-attack with a weapon that has inadvertent or secondary 
(intended or unintended) indiscriminate effects.  Accidental release of a cyber-weapon 
could occur, or inadvertent collateral damage might occur from the weapons use.  In 
more serious cases, covert actions that caused serious damage could be leaked internally 
or attributed to the United States by the recipient.  Most cyber weapons are sophisticated 
in design, with highly pointed effects. Some are designed for a single purpose, others for 
one time use and then deletion, yet second and third order effects are much harder to 
determine with any certainty.  Cyber fallout is a real possibility that should be taken into 
account during the planning process.  Even when an attack is legal and justified, 
consideration should be given to this option.   
Decision makers will struggle with this option, as self-attributing a wrongful or 
even illegal act could harm the United States in foreign policy. Some of the questions and 
issues to consider include: 
• Was the effect of the cyber-weapon outside of the expected outcome? 
• Did the use of the cyber-weapon violate the law of armed conflict? 
• Could self-attribution of the attack be useful in foreign relations?  Will 
righting the wrong help to make a bad situation better?   
• Would possible second or third-party attribution or leaking of the action 
by an insider be more harmful to the U.S. than open, self-
acknowledgement? 
• Can self-attribution be conducted privately between the U.S. and the 
affected party?  Direct diplomatic intervention at the state level without 
wider public acknowledgement could save face with both parties. 
• Can redress take place covertly, such as the removal of malicious software 
from adversary machines without public knowledge? 
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How do policy and decision makers keep a bad situation from getting worse?  For 
example, in 1960, after repeated denials, President Eisenhower had to admit CIA 
involvement in Soviet overflights for intelligence gathering.  The U-2 spy plane incident 
was an avoidable embarrassment.  Consider the recent leaks by Edward Snowden 
concerning the National Security Agency’s programs.93  Perhaps blanketed denial of U.S. 
cyber capabilities isn’t the answer in all situations.  Self-attribution either publicly or 
privately could be an answer to these problems.  International law, the Responsibilities of 
States and just war theory all support this notion, that states are responsible for their 
actions and that redress of wrongs is a state’s responsibility.  Timing of such redress is 
always post-action and as the saying goes: “bad news doesn’t get better with time”.   
Obviously there are endless geo-political minutia to consider, but self-attribution 
to set things right is a valid strategic option.  This strategy might be useful, not only in 
achieving our national interests, but also in limiting damages from our cyber activities to 
our international policy and reputation.  It further can assist in establishing norms in 
cyberspace.   The recent U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace stresses that “We 
will build and sustain an environment in which norms of responsible behavior guide 
states’ actions, sustain partnerships, and support the rule of law in cyberspace” (US-ISC 
8).  Likewise, the White House “Cyberspace Policy Review” highlights the need for 
norms in the international community regarding territorial jurisdiction, sovereign 
responsibility, and use of force (20).  Self-attribution to set things right can be a strategy 
to establish norms of responsible behavior.  If so, leadership in responsible behavior 
should be incorporated into our decision making; this strategy can support this notion.  
93 Edward Snowden is a former contractor of the NSA who leaked a large number of classified 
documents to the media.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Through the course of history, leaders have struggled with providing security to 
their people.  To these ends, strategies have been developed to achieve that security in 
and among nations.  War, a violent and overt tool of strategy has been one traditional way 
of settling differences between nations.  Attacking one’s enemy to ensure one’s own 
security is not unusual, but over time has come to be viewed as uncivilized and banned to 
the extent that the international community can enforce it.  Norms emerged from this 
order.  Cyberspace however presents a new domain and challenges those norms, 
particularly because of the attribution problem.  Where the use of conventional and 
nuclear weapons is in most cases tied to the identity of the user, that bond is uncoupled in 
cyberspace.  This domain is one where nations have the opportunity to attack with low 
degrees of attribution and therefore low risk of reprisal.  This applies equally to just and 
unjust wars and actions.   
When the decision is made to conduct cyber-attack, men and women of our 
government must deal with the results of our attack.  A decision must be made either 
before or after the attack as to a self-attribution stance; to tell the adversary that we 
conducted the attack or to keep the attack covert.  Decision makers may be faced with 
situations where United States strategy and policy point one way and international law 
the other.   Law tells us what we may and may not do.  Strategy is the method in which 
we will achieve our national interests.  However, in cyberspace there are no legal 
restraints on this decision.  This thesis has shown that self-attribution of cyber-attack is 
not required by international law.  For the United States, this means that public 
acknowledgement of a cyber-attack may ultimately only “legally” come in the form of a 
declaration of war, unless it is in our strategic interest to do so.  This claim is based on 
the requirement of the Executive and Congress as set forth in War Powers Act, and 
supported legally by the Tallinn Manual and the U.N Charter and ethically through just 
war theory.   
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A. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
As cyber capabilities mature and future generations of political and military 
leaders are faced with decisions regarding self-attribution, they too must consider the 
impact to the international community.  The new domain of cyberspace interconnects us 
in ways that may surpass those of physical space.  Nations will clash in new and 
unexpected ways and private citizens will realize unprecedented power, as the price to 
enter the cyber-arena is driven lower and lower.  Norms in the international politics of 
cyberspace will materialize, and creating those norms requires leadership, cooperation 
and some level of transparency.  Self-attribution of attacks can drive the establishment of 
these norms among nations.   
New ideas will have to be developed to forward norms in cyberspace, future work 
might consider the following such ideas. First, treaties guaranteeing no “first use” of 
cyber weapons could be established.   No first use would establish what cyber capabilities 
would be considered off the table in the conduct of nations in cyberspace.   Alternatively, 
the international community could agree that all nations take greater responsibility for the 
actions of their citizenry in cyberspace. This action places the onus of responsibility and 
policing on the nation and perhaps renews enforcement options in the international 
community.  In any case, the international community must come together to answer 
basic questions regarding “use of force” and “armed attack” long before these norms can 
effectively be established. 
B. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, it has become apparent that deciding on a self-attribution stance is 
as much an art of foreign policy as it is an art of war.  This thesis has examined the 
question; under what strategic and legal criteria should the United States publicly 
acknowledge responsibility for a cyber-operation?  From the perspective of international 
law, there are no hard requirements to self-attribute an action in cyberspace, even in the 
most extreme cases.  Strategically, self-attribution has a valid place in building deterrence 
models and in foreign policy as another tool of soft power or reconciliation.  Both cases  
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should incorporate thought on the ethical use of cyber weapons, as what a nation may do 
legally or illegally to achieve its national aims may well have unintended consequences 
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